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Background
Privacy concerns are rapidly increasing and there is a growing need for better privacy 
mechanisms to protect the privacy of individuals for different domains like social net-
works, Micro-data releases etc. There are different types of anonymization criterion like 
k-anonymity [1], ł-diversity [2] etc., (see [3] for some more mechanisms) proposed for 
temporally data base releases, however, still there are some issues in these methodolo-
gies to achieve privacy [3].
Motivation towards cooperative privacy
In the social network scenarios, the acceptance of an unknown friend request causes 
providing his personal information as well as his existing friend’s information. In other 
words, the friend who doesn’t aware about privacy and if he accepts the friend request, 
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then it may paves a way towards privacy theft of his private information as well as his 
friend’s information. It is not just enough to preserve our personal privacy, the people 
circled around us should also take an action. Though many social network sites provide 
different levels of privacy control, in addition rational cooperation of the people is also 
necessary.
Domingo-Ferrer initiates epitome of cooperation in privacy and termed it as Co-Pri-
vacy [4, 5]. However, CoV (cooperative value) is modeled, that estimates the cooperation 
between the tuples using Cooperative Game Theory and it is titled as cooperative pri-
vacy. The following are the prime motivations towards the cooperative privacy (CoP) [5]:
  • To keep the information society growing on over a period of time, preservation of pri-
vacy is necessary It is just like trying to solve the global issues (e.g. international ter-
rorism, global warming etc.) to sustain the physical world. Now, information society 
gives importance to preservation of privacy as they understand its significance but 
are scared of using these services. The people are forced towards privacy preserva-
tion in information society, just like the importance given to Go-Green and No Plas-
tic by the environmentalists in society.
  • As far as possible, privacy should be maintained by the rational cooperation of oth-
ers, in absence of which the entire information system may be inconsistent It is similar 
to the traffic rules. If a person doesn’t follow the traffic rules, it causes a trouble to 
others and some times it may lead to deadlock. Even though the government has 
scaffold privacy of users as human rights, they still remain quite unrealistic. Just the 
setting of rules by the government is not enough to achieve privacy preservation, 
effort should be put by the technology people to enforce the users to maintain pri-
vacy world. At the same time there should be a rational cooperation among the users 
for societal usefulness.
This paper proposes a game named Cooperative Privacy Game (CoPG), using Coali-
tional Game Theory [6] to find the CoP of a data set which is to be published. In CoPG, 
each tuple is considered as a player and assigned a real value called cooperative value 
(CoV), which is formally defined as characteristic function. The CoV of each player in 
the data table is defined as stated by Shapley value [7] which assumes the compactness 
around it. CoPG is to cogitate the cooperation between the tuples (players) which is esti-
mated based on the CoV. CoV is used to divide the given data table into groups, each 
called as coalition. Later, by applying anonymization techniques over these coalitions 
CoP is achieved in terms of Nash equilibria [6] for k-anonymity [1].
Since the underlying game CoPG is convex [8], the algorithm which is used in for-
mation of coalitions, is efficient and yields high quality with respect to intensity and 
disperse. Here, intensity is the average distance between the point to the center and dis-
perse is the average distance between point to point. The Shapley value of the charac-
teristic function of the coalitional game is considered in this paper coincides with other 
solution concepts named Nucleolus, Gately point, τ-value. This was proved by Swapnil 
et al. [9]. It supports the adoption of the characteristic function, defined in the later sec-
tion, for this game. Anonymization efficiency is calculated by using information loss 
metric and the advantages of proposed algorithms are discussed.
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Related work
The notion of k-anonymity principle to protect privacy before publishing the data has been 
proposed by [1]  Aggarwal [10], Bayardo et al. [11], LeFever et al. [12], Samarati et al. [13] 
employed and discussed suppression/generalization frameworks to achieve k-anonymity. 
To support the k-anonymity, new notions like l-diversity [2], t-closeness [14], (α, k)-ano-
nymity [15] were proposed which improve the privacy protection mechanism. Giving these 
protected data sets to other parties for data mining does not raise the privacy issues but 
none of the existing methods are able to completely exhaust the risk of privacy protection.
Garg et  al. [8] attained pattern clustering, an important methodology in data min-
ing, by using game theory and proposed the use of Shapley value to give a good start to 
K-means. For clustering, Gupta and Ranganathan [16, 17] used a microeconomic game 
theoretic approach, which simultaneously optimizes two objectives, viz. compaction and 
equi-partitioning. Bulo and Pelillo [18] describes hypergraph clustering using evolu-
tionary games. Chun and Hokari [19] proved the coincidence of Nucleolus and Shapley 
value for queueing problems.
Wang et  al. [20] proposed efficient privacy preserving two-factor authentication 
schemes related to wireless sensor networks  [21] presented a methodology using two-
factor authentication to overcome the threat of de-synchronization attack of preserving 
anonymity  [22, 23] initiated evaluation metric for anonymous—two factor authentica-
tion in distribution systems. Recent study in crime data publishing [24] achieved k-ano-
nymity with constrained resources.
Generally, to estimate the trade-off, Game theory is one of the good methodologies. In 
Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) game theory is used to estimate the trade-off 
between utility measure and privacy level. Anderson [25] explains how the Game theory 
is applied and analyzed the privacy in legal issues. In Economical perspective, Bhome 
et  al. [26], Kleinberg [27], Calzolari et  al. [28], Preibusch [29] present many privacy 
issues. Calzolari [28] uses game theory techniques to explore the flow of customer’s pri-
vate information between two interested firms. Dwork [30] proposed differential privacy 
using mechanism design methodology of game theory. In the context of recommender 
systems Machanavajjhala [31] defines an accuracy metric for differential privacy which 
analyzes the trade-off between privacy and accuracy.
Kleinberg et al. [27] described three scenarios modelled as Coalitional Games (intro-
duced in Osborne [32]) and the reward allocation exchange of private information is 
done according to the core and Shapley values. Chakravarthy et  al. [33–35] described 
coalitional game theory mechanism to achieve k-anonymization for a data set.
Preliminaries
This section outlines the information available in literature for k-anonymity and concise 
information about coalitional game theory concepts viz. Convex game, Shapley value, 
Core [32] and the related are given.
k‑anonymity
Burnett et  al. [36], presented the classification of attributes of a data table D. Explicit 
Identifiers (EID), Quasi Identifiers (QID), Sensitive Attributes (SA) and Non-Sensitive 
Attributes (NSA) are different classifiers of the attributes. EID is set of attributes which 
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explicitly identify a person and his possible sensitive information, whereas the set of 
attributes which can potentially identify the sensitive information of a person by asso-
ciating other external sources is QID. The set containing attributes like Disease, Salary 
etc., which holds sensitive information of a person is given by SA and remaining that do 
not fall into the above three are categorized as NSA.
If every data tuple in a data table D is indiscernible, under QID set of attributes, with 
at least k-1 other tuples then the table is said to k-anonymized. For example, Table 1 is 
3-anonymized version of Table 2. 
Cooperative game
A Cooperative game G with transferable utility (TU) [37] consists of two parameters N 
and ν. N is a set of n players i.e., N= {1,2,..., n} and ν is a real valued function defined over 
power set of N, P(N) i.e., ν : P(N) → R, ν(φ) = 0 is called characteristic function or 
value function. For any subset S of N, ν(S) is called as value or worth of the coalition S 
and this is explained with a simple example [38].
Example There are there players i.e. N = {1,2,3}. Player 1 is a seller, players 2 and 3 are 
buyers. Player 1 has a single unit to sell and its cost is $4. Each buyer is interested to buy 
the unit. Players 2 and 3 ’willingness-to-pay’ are $9 and $11 respectively. Now the game 
is characterized as follows.
Table 1 Data records after anonymization and it is 3-anonymized data table
Job Sex Age Disease
Professional Person [25–30] Cancer
Professional Person [25–30] HIV
Professional Person [25–30] Asthma
Artist Female [30–35] HIV
Artist Female [30–35] Hepatitis
Artist Female [30–35] Flu
Table 2 Sample data records before anonymization
Job Sex Age Disease
Lawyer Male 28 Cancer
Engineer Male 25 HIV
Doctor Female 30 Asthma
Writer Female 34 HIV
Singer Female 32 Hepatitis
Dancer Female 35 Flu
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The characteristic function ν is defined as
The intuition of ν is pretty simple. If there is no coalition for transact then the pay-off 
is zero and this shows first three definitions. Now if Player 1 and 2 come together and 
transact then the total gain of this coalition is the difference between buyer’s willingness-
to-pay and sell’s cost price and hence it is $5. Similarly worth of the coalition of Player 
1 and 3 is $7. These two are represented by 4th and 5th relations. Players 2 and 3 can-
not come together as each is trying for seller but not the buyer and therefore the worth 
is $0. Finally, ν({1, 2, 3}) = $7 not $5 + $7 = $12, because Player 1 has only one unit to 
sell and so he can transacts with only one buyer either Player 2 or Player 3. Obviously, 
Player 1 transact with the higher willingness-to-pay to maximize his worth, henceforth, 
ν({1, 2, 3}) = $7 rather than $5.
Convex cooperative game
A cooperative game G is Convex [35] if for any S,T ⊆ N, ν(S ∪ T ) =
ν(S)+ ν(T )− ν(S ∩ T ). It means that the marginal contribution of a player ti is more for 
S ⊇ T  i.e. larger coalitions and formally:
Any coalitional game can be analyzed by using solution concepts, which describes the 
distribution patterns of the total value of the game among individual players. The follow-
ing are some of the solution concepts.
The core
Let x = (x1, x2, ... xn) be a payoff allocation vector, where xi is the payoff of ith player. The 
core is the set of all payoff allocation vectors which satisfy the following properties.
  • Individual rationality: ∀i ∈ N, xi ≥ ν({i})








Every payoff allocation in the core of the game is ‘stable’, intuitively, no player will get 
benefit by unilaterally deviating from a given payoff allocation of the core. A payoff allo-
cation which holds Individual’s rationality and collective rationality is called Imputation.
Shapley value
The Shapley value of coalitional game is a solution concept. It explains the expected pay-




ν({1, 2}) = $9− $4 = $5
ν({1, 3}) = $11− $4 = $7
ν({2, 3}) = $0
ν({1, 2, 3}) = $7
(1)∀T , T ⊆ S ⊆ N\{ti}, for ti ∈ N(ν(S ∪ {ti})− ν(S) ≥ (ν(T ∪ {ti})− ν(T ))
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total payoff among the players of the coalition formation. The payoff allocation, based on 
this solution concept, is fair as it is including the information of each player’s contribu-
tion to the total value i.e., it assumes the relative importance of the each player in coali-
tion formation [39].
Let  be set of all permutations over N and xπi  be contribution of player ti to permuta-
tion π of CoPG G. Any imputation cov = (cov1, cov2, . . . covn) is a Shapley value fairly dis-
tribution if it follows the axioms of Lloyd Shapley [7]. The Shapley value of each player i 
in the game G, is formally given by
To overcome the rigidness of computation of the Eq. 2, [8] provided an equivalent equa-
tion stated as follows:
In the evaluation of CoV of each tuple underlying the solution concept, Shapley value 
is the only mapping in the distribution of payoff’s of the players in a coalitional game 
which follows the properties like linearity, symmetry and carrier property [8]. This is one 
of the reasons, why we take on Shapley value in the process of computing cooperative 
value (CoV) which is used in the proposed method.
Cooperative Privacy Game Model
This Game Model provides a mechanism to find out the privacy level, k-anonymity [1], 
of the given data set by using the cooperation between the tuples. The underlying coop-
eration between every pair of tuples is estimated and termed as CoV. CoV takes advan-
tage of Shapley value of each tuple. The data is segregated into groups based on the CoV.
Assume a data set D having an attribute set A, and among them AQID is collection of 
QID’s of D, i.e. AQID = {AQID1 ,AQID2 , . . .AQIDq }. Let DQID ⊆ D be the set of possible 
tuples of D under AQID. Consider DQID = {t1, t2, ...tn} is the projection of D under AQID 
of n input instances. A real valued function d, called distance function (for instance 
Euclidean Distance), defined as d : DQIDXDQID → {0} ∪R+, where d(ti, tj)∀ti, tj ∈ DQID 
gives the distance between ti and tj, and also it is clear that d(ti, ti) = 0.
To set up a CoPG among the players(tuples) CoV is a function defined as 
f : {0} ∪R+ → [0, 1]. Insightfully, if two data tuples, namely, ti and tj are very similar 
then the f (d(ti, tj)) reaches 1.
where dmax is maximum of the distances between all pairs of points in the data set. It is 
used to normalize the distances.




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!












(4)f (d(ti, tj)) = 1−
d(ti, tj)
dmax
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  • Each tuple is a player and N = DQID, so |N| = n.
  • Every player interacts with other players and tries to maximize their CoV as it 
depends on the ‘average increase in their worth’ across all valid subsets.
  • The characteristic function ν is defined as follows for all coalitions S ⊆ N
Equation 5, computes the total worth of the coalition S and it has quadratic computa-
tion complexity which is proved in later section. The worth of the coalition is calculated 
as the sum of pairwise coordinations between the players; consequently this formula-
tion smartly forms groups, each being called coalition which fulfil the property that 
the points having more CoV will be in the same coalition. These are formed based on 
the similarities between the players, leading to seclusion of data set into groups. These 
groups further under go anonymization process, which is discussed in the following 
sections.
Convexity of CoPG
In the process of proving that CoPG is convex, here are some propositions stated and 
proved.
Proposition 1 The Cooperative game G = (N, ν) is convex where ν is defined as
Proof According to the definition of Convex game 1, for any player tk ∈ N, if we con-
sider two coalitions S and T such that T ⊆ S ⊆ N \ {tk} then
Every convex Cooperative game has non-empty core [6] and also Shapley value 
belonging to core. From the Proposition 1, our CoPG with characteristic function stated 
in the Eq. 5 is a convex game and hence it has a solution.
Complexity of calculating cooperative value
This section presents the calculation process of CoV. The CoV for each tuple in the data 
table is computed using Eq. 3, but the computation is hard because it includes n! as a fac-
tor. The following proposition overcomes the computational infeasibility and provides a 














f (d(ti, tj)) otherwise
{ν(S ∪ {tk})− ν(S)} − {ν(T ∪ {tk})− ν(T )}




f (d(ti, tk))} − {ν(T )+
∑
ti∈T




f (d(ti, tk)) ≥ 0 (∵ Rangeoffis[0, 1])
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Proposition 2 Computational complexity of cooperative value (CoV), i.e. Eq.  3, is 
quadratic.
Proof According to Eq. 3 we have
That implies CoV is the summation of contribution of the player ti for each coalition over 
all possible permutations. But for specific ti, xπi  is equal to summation of all similarities 
with other players whose position is less than the position of ti with respect to a specific 
permutation.
Now for specific ti and tj the total number of possible permutations is (n− 2)!. So, the 
second summation in above equation contains (n− 2)! terms. Also if ti takes first posi-
tion in a permutation then there is no possibility of tj, if ti takes second position then one 
possibility is there for tj. If we metric then we have the following and hence the result.
If we adopt the above argument, the CoV of a tuple ti can be found with O(n) com-
plexity. So, in quadratic time we can estimate the CoV of all tuples of given data table. 
In experimentations it is observed that evolution of CoVs takes about linear time as the 
actual participation of ti is very less than the possible permutations n!.
Proposition 3 In convex CoPG setting for given ǫ > 0 and d(ti, tj) ≤ ǫ → 0, ∀ti, tj ∈ N 
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Proof  From Proposition 3:
Hence the hypothesis follows with the argument: as ǫ → 0 implies covi → covj  



















































(N− 2) ∗ ǫ
2 ∗ dmax
Fig. 1 Anonymization process architecture: cooperation, between pair of records, is estimated as first step 
and as a second step CoV of each record is calculated. In third and fourth steps, respectively, seclusion and 
anonymization are performed
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Insightfully, the above proposition states that the cooperative values of tuples which 
are more similar i.e., the distance between them is almost zero, are nearly equal. It 
results that the tuples having almost equal CoV will be in same coalition.
Achieving cooperative privacy
This section describes the mechanism adopted by the data protector who is taking 
action about privacy of sensitive information in his data releases. Figure  1, shows the 
possible steps involved in the process of anonymization for a given data set D to achieve 
cooperative privacy.
The methodology of the process is explained in the following steps:
1. Calculate Cooperation value between each pair The similarity between every pair 
of tuples (players) is estimated as Cooperation value of the pair in the given data set 
DQID using Eq. 4.
2. Evaluating CoV For each tuple CoV is assigned a value using Eq.  6 and Proposition 2.
3. Process of seclusion The tuples are secluded into groups based on CoV, which 
undergo anonymization process.
4. Anonymization Each secluded group of given data table is anonymized and the 
k-anonymized data along with information loss and k value of the data table D is 
published.
Calculating values of cooperation
In step 1, a data set D is considered with set of attributes A. By choosing the QID attrib-
utes, we have set of quasi identifiers AQID. The projection of D under AQID is DQID . 
By using Eq. 4, the CoV between every pair of tuples of DQID is found. A symmetric 
matrix of order n (as DQID is having n tuples) called CoMatrix can be constructed using 
the cooperative values. According to proposition 2, this CoMatrix can be constructed 
in quadratic polynomial time. For simplicity Manhattan distance is chosen as distance 
function in Eq. 4 and AQID with only numerical attributes. dmax, which is maximum of 
all possible distances, is used for normalization in the formalization itself. Algorithm, 
presented in the Table  3, explains the calculation of CoMatrix in O(n2) time and it is 
given as input to step 2.
Evaluation of CoV
In this section, the evaluation process of CoV of each tuple of DQID is discussed. It is a 
hard problem to compute the CoV, using Eq. 5, of each tuple as it includes n! permuta-
tion orderings. Nevertheless, the game setting G is convex, the underlying CoV is Shap-
ley value gives the center of gravity of the extreme points of the non-empty core [8]. The 
selection of characteristic function of this game model is shown in Eq. 3. As laid down 
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by Proposition 2 the CoV of each tuple can also be estimated using the following rela-
tion, quadratic time:
Algorithm, presented in the Table 4, describes how each tuple will be assigned CoV. It 
assumes the CoMatrix evaluated in previous step as input and returns an array of CoVs 
of size n, corresponding to DQID. This Algorithm takes O(n2) complexity.
Process of seclusion
This process describes how to seclude the tuples of the data set DQID into groups based 
on their CoVs, the inner sense is that, the density of tuples around a tuple will form a 
group. The basic idea is to start with a tuple whose CoV is maximum at the initial core 
point and collect all the tuples having ’very near’ CoVs as core point and put them into 
one group is named as coalition group. The parameter α is called cooperative parameter 
which governs this ’very near’ in the process.
The CoVs of tuples gradually decreases when they are far away from the center of the 
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a non-linear decreasing function has been considered. For this, α = β ∗ h(lmax) is taken 
into account where h is defined over the set of all CoVs and β ∈ [0, 1] is a weight factor. 




 is considered. Here, gmax is global maximum of CoV used 
for normalization of the CoVs and lmax is local maximum of coalition group. However, 
any degradation function α can be chosen over these CoVs based on the domain values 
of the given data set and by the same token β also.
Growth Control Queue (GCQ) is an array introduced in the Algorithm (see Table 5). 
The advantage of using this queue is to add tuple indexes to the queue, if their Shapley 
value is at least γ-multiple of center of the coalition. Here, γ is multiplicity of CoV. It 
senses that, GCQ contains all unallocated points which has very low CoV value as com-
pared to the density around the coalition group. These points do not take part in the 
further growth of the coalition group and it provides the uniform distribution of den-
sity throughout the coalition and the density does not vary beyond the threshold [9]. 
The GCQ grabs all this information and the empty queue manages the growth of the 
coalition.
Anonymization
This phase assumes the set of cooperative groups (CoG) as an input which is obtained 
from the third phase and it returns the anonymized data for the purpose of publishing by 
using anonymization algorithms [3]. Hierarchy free generalization of numerical attrib-
utes [12] are used to attain k-anonymization and information loss of the anonymized 
data is also measured.
Table 5 Algorithm
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In the process, for every coalition and for every QID attribute, max and min of all pos-
sible domain values are found and all these values are replaced under the QID in that 
particular group with [min, max]. Finally, k is calculated as Min of sizes of all possible 
partitions after the process.
The data user who is collecting the data from data collector, typically wants to get 
more information from it. When anonymized data set is published, some information 
is lost due to the algorithm applied over the data. The user needs more qualitative data 
for his purposes like data mining, etc. The quality of k-anonymization of a given data set, 
typically, calculate how much quality has been lost in process of anonymization. The uti-
lization of the data set after completion of the anonymization, is measured using infor-
mation loss(IL). There are different measures to estimate IL [3], however, the following 
relation is adopted to calculate IL of the numerical attributes after anonymization:
Here, Max[Dom(QIDj)] −Min[Dom(QIDj)] is the spread in domain of DQID under 
QIDj, and Max[Dom(CoGi,j)] −Min[Dom(CoGi,j)] is the spread of the domain of QIDj 
in the specific coalition group CoGi. So, we can consider the IL as sum of all ratios of the 
spreads weighted by the ratio of group size and data set size.
Algorithm, described in the Table  6 explores the process of anonymization of the 
coordination groups. It also explains the computation of the IL as well as finding k value 
for k-anonymization. It assumes the output of Algorithm 5 as input and returns IL of 
anonymized data, k value of k-anonymization and published data D′.
Experimentation and empirical analysis
Experiments have been performed on Intel Core @ 2.93 GHz with 4GB RAM out of it 2GB 
of RAM has been exclusively allocated for the Net Beans platform. Experiments are con-
ducted on Adult Data set available at UCI Machine Learning Repository [40]. 1000 records 
are selected randomly from the preprocessed Adult Data set which has 36,282 data records. 
Age, Fnlwgt, Hours-per-week, the numerical attributes, are chosen as Quasi Identifiers 
for our experimentation and number of coalitions, anonymity level, number of outliers, IL 
(using Eq. 7) are calculated over different values of similarity weight factor (β) and multi-
plicity factor (γ). As a state-of-art study, CoV algorithm is compared with Mondrain Mul-
tidimensional methodology [12] and K-member clustering for k-anonymity [41]. See Fig. 2.
Number of coalitions vs β and γ
The variations of number of coalitions over different γ values are given in Fig. 3. As multiplicity 
factor (γ) is increased, the number of coalitions increases, because, when multiplicity factor is 
relaxed then more number of tuples are included in the coalition which leads less number of 
coalitions i.e., if γ value is increased then there is a possibility for tight segregation which causes 
more number of coalitions. The number of coalitions is constant until some fixed value γ which 
relatively depends upon the weight factor β. Another observation is that there is a sudden climb 
after certain value (sum of β and γ is around 1.75 for our sample data set) and the growth rate of 
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Table 6 Algorithm





















Fig. 2 Comparison of CoV with K-Member clustering, Mondrain Multi-dimensional methods. Information 
loss is estimated using the three methods and variations are presented. Our method shows the consistency 
with the size of the data records where as the other two gradually decrease. Dramatically, when data size is 
largeref:adam.1996 marg the methods give approximate equality
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Figure 4 depicts the relation between number of coalitions and β. It is observed that 
the kind of variations is almost same as above, but growth rate in number of coalitions is 
more as compared with the former one. So, it can be said that the influence of β is more 
than that of γ in the process of Seclusion.
Number of outliers vs β and γ
The coalitions having single record are marked as outliers in Algorithm (see Table 5), and 
the number of outliers for different values of β and γ are established. Figure 5 depicts the 
variations of number of outliers with γ. It shows that there is no possibility of outliers for 
lesser values of γ. The relaxation of γ, includes the tuples which are defined as outliers in 
the case of more values of γ.
Intuitively, the records which are far away, in distance point of view, from the coali-
tions are also included when γ is reduced. It can be observed that the number of outli-
ers decrease as β decreases. A similar observation can be seen in Fig. 6, then graphs are 
drawn for number of outliers and β. The presence of outliers are more than the previous 


















































































































































Fig. 4 Number of coalitions vs β
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Information loss vs β and γ
This section presents how the IL varies over the parameters weight factor β and multi-
plicity factor γ. Figure 7 describes the changes in the IL with different γ values. The IL is 
calculated using Eq. 7. As γ increases it doesn’t allow to include more number of records 
into the groups. So, IL calculated by using Eq. 7 implies that the coalitions having more 
similar data records, have less information loss. Insightfully, when we relax the γ then 
the far away tuple are also included into the groups.
In the present work for the anonymization process over these groups hierarchy free 
construction is used. In this methodology the values of an attribute are generalised in a 
group by min, max. While implementing this process if a far way tuple is included in the 
group then unnecessarily more generalization is required which in turn increases the IL. 
This implies that the IL increases with the increase in γ.
The behaviour of the graphs plotted for IL and different cases of β are almost same. 
The IL is constant as γ increases until some point, then there is a sudden decline at which 
the sum of β and γ assumes some fixed value (It is around 1.75 for our sample data set). 
























































Fig. 5 Outliers vs γ
























































Fig. 6 Outliers vs β
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Figure 8, shows the relation between IL and β. Similar patterns shown above are seen but 
the rate of decrease is less than the previous cases and thence it can be concluded that 
the algorithm is more influenced by β.
Information loss vs size of data set
In this section the variation of IL value with size of data set is explained. Figure 9 depicts 
the IL values corresponding to different sizes of data for different β and γ. For all cases, 
it shows that there are fluctuations up to certain size depending upon the data set. After 
that IL increases but the rate of growth is less compared to the rate of growth of size of 
the data set. When β and γ are equal to 1, the interpolated curve for IL is shown in Fig. 10.
Representation of information loss, β and γ
Figure 11 shows that the change in IL over the variation in β and γ. The graph shows that 
the IL is minimum when β and γ are equal to 1. IL value increases as β or γ increases, but 
simultaneously the number of outliers decrease as shown in Figs. 5 and 6.




































































Fig. 7 Information loss vs γ








































































Fig. 8 Information loss vs β
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β=γ=0.96 β=γ=0.97 β=γ=0.98 β=γ=0.99 β=γ=1
Fig. 9 Relation between information loss with size of the data set similar pattern can be observed for Infor-
mation loss with respect to data size, by varying β and γ


















Interapolated Values (γ=β =1)
Fig. 10 Interpolate curve between information loss and size of the data set: estimated Information loss 
according to number of data records for given β and γ equal to one. More fluctuations can be seen for less 
number of records because of occurrence of more outliers. In contrast, if data size increases information loss 
























Fig. 11 Relation between information loss, β and γ : variation of information loss is shown for given β and γ . 
The best choice for least Information Loss is for both β and γ equal to 1
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Conclusions and future work
Different mechanisms are required to protect the privacy in information society, where 
people are forced to give private information. Rational cooperation between the people 
who are involved in the information society is required inspite of several rules imposed 
by the governments. This motivation led towards this novel strategy of Cooperative Pri-
vacy for Privacy Preserving Data Publishing using Cooperative Game theory.
To achieve privacy in Data releases a Cooperative Privacy Game (CoPG) is set up, in 
which each tuple in the data table behaves as a player, trying to preserve their privacy 
and in turn helps in preserving other’s privacy. This is formalized with characteristic 
function ν. All the tuples(players) segregate themselves to form groups called coalitions 
based on Cooperative value (CoV). The CoV of each tuple is calculated based on the 
solution concept Shapley value. The CoV fairly distributes the worth through out the 
group of the tuples and the separation is also unbiased. The separation process and hier-
archy free anonymization process are described. Algorithms which required for the pro-
cesses are presented. Experimentation results and insightful observations are reported.
As a future work, the following directions are provided and these are non-exhaustive:
  • Expanding this approach to incorporate the security functionalities which are 
obtained from the players involved in the game.
  • Expanding the theory to design a game model with mixed strategies rather than pure 
strategies for Cooperative privacy because the user in the game may act differently 
with other players.
  • In experimentation process outliers were obtained. To decrease the possible outliers 
appropriate mechanisms are to be incorporated to the model.
  • Extensive study of theory is necessary for the choice of β and γ.
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